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Abstract. Recent formal approaches towards causality have made the concept
ready for incorporation into the technical world. However, causality reasoning is
computationally hard; and no general algorithmic approach exists that efficiently
infers the causes for effects. Thus, checking causality in the context of com-
plex, multi-agent, and distributed socio-technical systems is a significant challenge.
Therefore, we conceptualize an intelligent and novel algorithmic approach towards
checking causality in acyclic causal models with binary variables, utilizing the op-
timization power in the solvers of the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT). We
present two SAT encodings, and an empirical evaluation of their efficiency and
scalability. We show that causality is computed efficiently in less than 5 seconds
for models that consist of more than 4000 variables.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Accountability
The tremendous power of modern information technology, and cyber-physical, systems
is rooted, among other things, in the possibility to easily compose them using software.
The ease of composition is due to the virtual nature of software: if a system provides an
application programming interface, then other systems can in principle directly interact
with that system. As we will argue, it is inherently impractical to specify all “legal,” or
“safe,” or “secure” interactions with a system. In turn, this means that the possibility of
illegal, unsafe or insecure interactions cannot be excluded at design time. As a conse-
quence, we cannot ensure the “adequate” functioning of such open systems; hence need
to be prepared for failures of the system; and therefore need accountability mechanisms
that help us identify the root cause, or responsibility, for such a failure. The technical
contribution of this article is an efficient procedure for checking a specific kind of causal-
ity.
Traditionally, safety and also security analysis of critical systems start by determin-
ing the system’s boundary. We will concentrate on the technical boundary here. Any
accessible software interface, or API, then is part of that boundary. In practice, these
1Work supported by the German National Science Foundation DFG under grant no. PR1266/3-1, Design
Paradigms for Societal- Scale Cyber-Physical Systems.
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interface descriptions are syntactic in nature. Among other things, this means that they
abstract from restrictions on the usage of the API. For instance, a collection of data may
need to be initialized before it is used, which is a requirement that is not part of the
syntactic interface but may require additional specification in the form of sequencing
requirements.
This example generalizes: Many restrictions on the potential usage of an API are left
implicit, or come as comments in the best case. The academic community has therefore
suggested, for a long time, to provide more detailed interface descriptions. A typical ex-
ample for such interfaces are contracts [26] that require the specification of preconditions
and postconditions for the usage of a specific piece of functionality.
In practice, today’s software interfaces continue to be mostly syntactic, in spite of
decades of research and impressive results on richer notions of interfaces that also in-
corporate (more detailed descriptions of) the behavior of a component. We prefer not to
speculate about the lack of adoption of these ideas in practice. Instead, we would like to
remind that any interface description provides a behavior abstraction—and in this sense,
the syntactic interface, or API, provides such a coarse abstraction as well: data elements
of a certain type are mapped to data elements of another type.
Arguably, this is the coarsest abstraction of behavior that still is useful in practice.
At the other end of the spectrum of levels of abstraction, one may argue that the finest
possible abstraction is that of the code itself. However, we do share the perspective that
code itself provides an abstraction of behavior in that in most programming languages
it does not explicitly talk about time or resource utilization. In this sense, code is not
the finest possible abstraction of behavior. Be that as it may, the above shows that there
is a huge spectrum of possible levels of abstraction for describing the behavior, or an
interface, of a system. It is important to remember that none of these levels as such is
“better” than another level: this depends on the purpose of the abstraction, as is the case
for any kind of model [32].
All this does not necessarily constitute novel insights. There is a consequence, how-
ever, that we feel has been underestimated in the past and that is the basis for the work
presented here: Regardless of the level of abstraction of an interface that we choose, there
must, by definition, always be parts of the behavior that are left unspecified. And this,
in turn, means that the boundary of a software-intensive system usually is not, should
not, and most importantly: cannot be specified without leaving open several degrees of
freedom in terms of how to “legally” use the system. It hence cannot be excluded that
a system S1 is used by another system S2 in a way that the developer of S1 has never
envisaged and which violates implicit assumptions that were made when developing S1,
possibly leading to a runtime failure of S1 and, by consequence, also of S2.
2
One consequence is that software-rooted failures for composed, or open, systems
cannot be excluded by design. Because these systems are becoming ever more complex,
we consider it hence mandatory to providemechanisms for understanding the root causes
of a failure, both for eliminating the underlying (technical) problem and for assigning
blame.
2We believe that this construction helps us understand what the notion of an “open system” means: At face
value, a software-intensive system S cannot be “open” because there is a well-specified (syntactic) interface for
the behavior of S. However, if this interface description is too coarse and cannot or does not specify restrictions
on how to use S, some usage of S may violate implicit assumptions made while developing S. In this sense,
every software-intensive system is then “open” if it may be used in a way that violates implicit assumptions.
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We call a system accountable that can help answer questions regarding the root
cause of some (usually undesired) event (other notions of accountability are studied and
formalized elsewhere [18]). Accountability of a system requires at least two properties:
The system must provide evidence, usually in the form of logs, that helps understand the
reasons of the undesired event. Moreover, there must be some mechanism that can reason
about causality.
Different forms of causality are useful in our context. Just to mention two of them,
Granger causality identifies causality with a reduction of error when it comes to pre-
dicting one time series on the grounds of another [10]; and model-based diagnosis com-
putes candidate sets of potentially faulty components that can explain the failure of a sys-
tem [30]. In this article, we focus on one technical aspect of inferring one specific kind
of causality, namely Halpern-Pearl-style actual causality for counter-factual arguments:
Given a failure of a system (an effect) and a potential cause, we efficiently compute if,
by counterfactual argument, the potential cause is an actual cause.
1.2. Causality
Causality is a fundamental construct of human perception. Although our ability to link
effects to causes may seem natural, defining what precisely constitutes a cause has baf-
fled scholars for centuries. Early work on defining causality goes back to Hume in the
eighteenth century [15]. Hume’s definition hinted at the idea of counter-factual relations
to infer the causes of effects. Informally, we argue, counter to the fact, that A is a cause
of B if B does not occur if A no longer occurs. As Lewis noted with examples, this re-
lation is not sufficient to deal with interdependent, multi-factorial, and complex causes
[23]. Thus, the search for a comprehensive general definition of causality continues. Re-
cently, in computer science, there have been some successful and influential efforts, by
Halpern and Pearl, at formalizing the idea of counter-factual reasoning and addressing
the problematic examples in philosophy literature [12].
The work by Halpern and Pearl covers two notions of causality, namely actual (to-
ken) causality and type (general) causality. Type causality is a forward-looking link
that forecasts the effects of causes. It is useful for predictions in different domains like
medicine [19], and machine learning applications [29]. In this paper, we focus on actual
causality that is a rather retrospective linking of effects to causes. We are chiefly inter-
ested in the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of actual causality [11]. Causality is useful
in law [27], security [20], software and system verification [3,22], databases [24], and
accountability [9,17].
In essence, HP provides a formal definition of when we can call one or more events
a cause of another event in a way that captures the human intuition. There have been
three versions of HP: the original (2001), updated (2005), and modified (2015) versions,
the latter of which we are using. The fundamental contribution of HP is that it opens the
door for embedding the ability to reason about causality into socio-technical systems that
are increasingly taking control of our daily lives. Among other use cases, since actual
causality can be used to answer causal queries in the postmortem of unwanted behavior,
it is a vital ingredient to enable accountability. Utilizing HP in technical systems makes
it possible to empower them with all the other social concepts that should also be em-
bedded into the technical world, such as responsibility [6], blame, intention, and moral
responsibility [13].
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Causality checking, using any version of HP, is hard. For example, under the mod-
ified definition, determining causality is in general DP1 -complete, and NP-complete for
singleton causes [11]. The computational complexity led to a domain-specific (e.g.,
database queries, counter-examples of model checking), adapted (e.g., use lineage of
queries, use Kripke structure of programs), or restricted (e.g., monotone queries, single-
ton causes, single-equation models) utilization of HP (details in Section.2). Conversely,
brute-force approaches work with small models (less than 30 variables [14]) only. There-
fore, to the best of our knowledge, there exists no comprehensive, efficient, and scalable
framework for modeling and benchmarking causality checking for binary models (i.e.,
models with binary variables only). Consequently, no existing algorithm allows applying
HP on more complex examples than the simple cases in the literature.
In this paper, we argue that an efficient approach for checking causality opens the
door for new use cases that leverage the concept in modern socio-technical systems.
We conceptualize a novel approach towards checking causality in acyclic binary models
based on the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). We intelligently encode the core of
HP as a SAT query that allows us to reuse the optimization power built into SAT solvers.
As a consequence of the rapid development of SAT solvers (1000X+ each decade), they
offer a promising tactic for any solution in formal methods and program analysis [28].
Leveraging this power in causality establishes a robust framework for efficiently rea-
soning about actual causality. Moreover, since the transformation of SAT to other logic
programming paradigms like answer set programming (ASP) is almost straightforward,
this paper establishes the ground to tackle more causality issues (e.g., causality infer-
ence) using combinatorial solving approaches. Therefore, this paper makes the following
contributions:
– An approach to check causality over binary models. It includes two SAT-encodings
that reflect HP, and two variants for optimization,
– A Java library 3 that includes the implementation of our approach. It is easily
extensible with new optimizations and algorithms.
– An empirical evaluation that uses different examples to show the efficiency and
scalability of our approach.
2. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has tackled the technical implementa-
tion of the (modified) version of HP yet. Conversely, the first two versions were used in
different applications. Although they use different versions, we still consider them re-
lated. These applications used the definition as a refinement of other technologies. For
example, in [24,25,4,31], a simplified HP (the updated version) was used to refine prove-
nance information and explain database conjunctive query results. Theses approaches,
heavily depend on the correspondence between causes and domain-specific concepts like
lineage, database repairs, and denial constraints. As a simplification, the authors used
a single-equation causal model based on the lineage of the query in [24,25], and no-
equation model in [4,31]. The approaches also eliminate HP’s treatment of preemption.
Similar simplification has been made for Boolean circuits in [7].
3available at: https://github.com/amjadKhalifah/HP2SAT1.0/
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In the context of model verification, a concept that enhances a counterexample re-
turned by a model checker with a causal explanation based on a simplified version of
the updated HP was proposed in [3]. Their domain-specific simplification comes from
the fact that no dependencies between variables, and hence no equations, were required.
Moreover, they used the definition of singleton causes. Similarly, in [2,21], the authors
implemented different flavors of causality checking (based on the updated HP) using
Bounded Model Checking to debug models of safety-critical systems. They employed
SAT solving indirectly in the course of model checking. The authors stated that this ap-
proach is better in large models regarding performance than their previous work.
The common ground between all these approaches and our approach is the usage of
binary models. However, they were published before the modified HP version. Hence,
they used the older versions. In contrast to our approach, the previous works adapted the
definition for a domain specific purpose. This was reflected in restrictions on the equa-
tions of the binary model (single-equation, independent variables), the cause (singleton),
or dependency on other concepts (Kripke structures, lineage formula, counter-examples).
On the contrary, we propose algorithms to compute causality on binary models, without
adaptations.
Similar to our aim, [14] evaluated search-based strategies for determining causality
according to the original HP definition. Hopkins proposed ways to explore and prune
the search space, for computing ~W ,~Z that were required for that version, and considered
properties of the causal model that makes it more efficient for computation. The results
presented are of models that consist of less than 30 variables; in contrast, we show SAT-
based strategies that compute causality for models of thousands of variables.
Lastly, to prove the complexity classes, Halpern [11] used the relation between the
conditions and the SAT problem. However, the concrete encoding in SAT with a size that
is linear of the number of variables is still missing.
3. Halpern-Pearl Definition
In this section, we introduce the latest HP. All versions of HP use variables to describe
the world. Structural equations define how these variables influence each other. The vari-
ables are split into exogenous and endogenous variables. The values of the former, called
a context~u, are assumed to be governed by factors that are not part of the modeled world.
Consequently, exogenous variables cannot be part of a cause. The values of the endoge-
nous variables, in contrast, are determined by the mentioned equations. Formally, we de-
scribe a causal model in Definition 1. Similar to Halpern, we limit ourselves to acyclic
causal models, in which we can compute a unique solution for the equations given a
context~u.
Definition 1 Causal Model is a tuple M = (U,V,R,F), where
– U, V are sets of exogenous variables and endogenous variables respectively,
– R associates with Y ∈U ∪V a set R(Y ) of values,
– F associates with X ∈V FX : (×U∈UR(U))× (×Y∈V\{X}R(Y ))→ R(X)
Here, we define the necessary notations. A primitive event is a formula of the form X = x,
for X ∈ V and x ∈ R(X). A sequence of variables X1, ...,Xn is abbreviated as ~X . Analo-
gously, X1 = x1, ...,Xn = xn is abbreviated as ~X =~x. Variable Y can be set to value y by
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writing Y ← y (analogously~Y ←~y for vectors). ϕ is a Boolean combination of primitive
events. (M,~u) |= X = x if the variable X has value x in the unique solution to the equa-
tions inM in context~u. Intervention on a model is expressed, either by setting the values
of ~X to ~x, written as [X1 ← x1, ..,Xk ← xk], or by fixing the values of ~X in the model,
written as M~X←~x, which effectively replaces the equations for
~X by a constant equation
Xi = xi. So, (M,~u) |= [~Y ← ~y]ϕ is identical to (M~Y←~y,~u) |= ϕ [11]. Lastly, we use 7→
to express value substitution, e.g., [
−→
V 7→~v′]FX j refers to the evaluation of equation FX j
given that the values of other variables are set to~v′.
Definition 2 Actual Cause [11]
~X =~x is an actual cause of ϕ in (M,~u) if the following three conditions hold:
AC1. (M,~u) |= (~X =~x) and (M,~u) |= ϕ
AC2. There is a set ~W of variables in V and a setting~x′ of the variables in ~X such that if
(M,~u) |= ~W = ~w, then (M,~u) |= [~X ←~x′, ~W ← ~w]¬ϕ .
AC3.
−→
X is minimal: no subset of ~X satisfies AC1 and AC2.
The HP definition is presented in Definition 2. AC1 checks that the cause and the effect
occurred in the real world, i.e., in M given context ~u. AC3 is a minimality check to
deal with irrelevant variables. AC2 is the core; it matches the counter-factual definition
of causality. It holds if there exists a setting ~x′ of the variables in ~X different from the
original setting ~x (which led to ϕ holding true) and another set of variables ~W that we
use to fix variables at their original value, such that ϕ does not occur. Inferring ~W is
one source of the complexity of the definition. The role of ~W becomes clearer when
we consider the examples in [11]. Briefly, it captures the notion of preemption which
describes the case when one possible cause rules out the other based on, e.g., temporal
factors.
Halpern [11] shows that determining causality is in generalDP1 -complete. The family
of complexity classes DPk was introduced, in [1], to investigate the complexity of the
original and updated definitions. AC1 can be checked in polynomial time, while AC2
is NP-complete, and AC3 is co-NP-complete. To prove this complexity, Halpern [11]
showed that AC2 could be reduced to SAT, and AC3 to UNSAT. However, the concrete
encoding was not specified.
Example We consider a famous example from the literature: the rock-throwing ex-
ample [23], described as follows: Suzy and Billy both throw a rock at a bottle which shat-
ters if one of them hits it. We know that Suzy’s rock hits the bottle slightly earlier than
Billy’s and both are accurate throwers. Halpern models this story using the following
endogenous variables: ST, BT for “Suzy/Billy throws”, with values 0 (the person does
not throw) and 1 (s/he does), similarly, SH,BH for “Suzy/Billy hits”, and BS for “bottle
shatters”. The equations are:
- BS is 1 iff one of SH and BH is 1, i.e., BS= SH ∨BH
- SH is 1 iff ST is 1, i.e., SH = ST
- BH = 1 iff BT = 1 and SH = 0, i.e., BH = BT ∧¬SH
- ST , BT are set by exogenous variables, i.e., ST = STexo;BT = BTexo
Assuming a context ~u that sets ST = 1 and BT = 1, the original evaluation of the
model is: BS=1 SH=1 BH=0 ST=1 BT=1. Let us assume we want to find out whether ST
= 1 is a cause of BS = 1. Obviously, AC1 is fulfilled. As a candidate cause, we set ST = 0.
A first attempt with ~W = /0 shows that AC2 does not hold. However, if we arbitrary take
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~W = {BH}, i.e., we replace the equation of BH with BH = 0, then AC2 holds because
BS = 0, and AC3 automatically holds since the cause is a singleton. Thus, ST = 1 is a
cause of BS = 1.
4. Approach
In this section, we propose our algorithmic approaches towards the HP definition. To
answer a causal question efficiently, we need to find an intelligent way to search for a ~W
such that AC2 is fulfilled as well as to check whether AC3 holds. Therefore, we propose
an approach that uses SAT-solving. We show how to encode AC2 into a formula whose
(un)satisfiability and thus the (un)fulfillment of AC2 is determined by a SAT-solver. Sim-
ilarly, we show how to generate a formula whose satisfying assignments obtained with a
solver indicate if AC3 holds.
4.1. Checking AC2
For AC2, such a formula F has to incorporate (1) ¬ϕ , (2) a context ~u, (3) a setting, ~x′
for candidate cause, ~X , and (4) all possible variations of ~W , while still (5) keeping the
semantics of the underlying model M. In the following, we describe the concept and,
then, the algorithm that generates such a formula F . Since we check actual causality in
hindsight, we have a situation where ~u and ~v are determined, and we have a candidate
cause ~X ⊆ ~V . Thus, the first two requirements are straightforward. First, the effect ϕ
should not hold anymore, hence, ¬ϕ holds. Second, the context ~u should be set to its
values in the original assignment (the values~u of ~U).
Since we are treating binary models only, the setting ~x′ (from AC2) can be tailored
down to negating the original value of each cause variable. This is a result of Lemma 1,
which utilizes the fact that we are considering binary variables to exclude other possible
settings and define precisely the setting~x′. The proof of the Lemma is given in Appendix
A. Thus, to address the third requirement, according to Lemma 1, for ¬ϕ to hold, all the
variables of the candidate cause ~X are negated.
Lemma 1 In a binary model, if ~X =~x is a cause of ϕ , according to Definition 2, then
every~x′ in the definition of AC2 always satisfies ∀i.x′i = ¬xi.
To ensure that the semantics of the model are reflected in F (requirement 5), we use
the logical equivalence operator (↔) to express the equations. Particularly, to represent
the endogenous variable Vi and its dependency on other variables, we use this clause
Vi ↔ FVi . This way, we create a (sub-)formula that evaluates to true if both sides are
equivalent in their evaluation. If we do so for all other variables (that are not affected
by criteria 1-3), we ensure that F is only satisfiable for assignments that respect the
semantics of the model.
Finally, we need to find a possibility to account for ~W (requirement 4) without hav-
ing to iterate over the power-set of all variables. In F , we accomplish this by adding
a disjunction with the positive or negative literal of each variable Vi to the previously
described equivalence-formula, depending on whether the actual evaluation of Vi was 1
or 0, respectively. Then, we can interpret ((Vi ↔ FVi)∨ (¬)Vi) as “Vi either follows the
semantics ofM or takes on its original value represented as a positive or negative literal”.
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Algorithm 1 Check whether AC2 holds using SAT
Input: causal model M, context 〈U1, . . . ,Un〉 = 〈u1, . . . ,un〉, effect ϕ , candidate cause
〈X1, . . . ,Xℓ〉= 〈x1, . . . ,xℓ〉, evaluation 〈V1, . . . ,Vm〉= 〈v1, . . . ,vm〉
1: function FULFILLSAC2(M, ~U =~u,ϕ ,~X =~x,~V =~v)
2: if (M,~u) |= [~X ←¬~x]¬ϕ then return /0
3: else
4: F := ¬ϕ ∧
∧
i=1...n
f (Ui = ui) ∧
∧
i=1...m,6∃ j•X j=Vi
(
Vi ↔ FVi ∨ f (Vi = vi)
)
→֒ ∧
∧
i=1...ℓ
f (Xi = ¬xi)
5: with f (Y = y) =
{
Y, y= 1
¬Y, y= 0
6: if 〈U1 = u1 . . .Un = un,V1 = v
′
1 . . .Vm = v
′
m〉 ∈ SAT(CNF(F)) then
7: ~W := 〈W1, . . . ,Ws〉 s.t. ∀i∀ j • (i 6= j⇒Wi 6=Wj)∧ (Wi =V j ⇔ v
′
j = v j)
8: return ~W
9: else return not satisfiable
10: end if
11: end if
12: end function
By doing so for all endogenous variables, we allow for all possible variations of ~W . It is
worth noting that we exclude those variables that are in ~X from obtaining their original
value, as we are already changed their setting to ¬~x and thus keeping a potential cause
at its original value is not reasonable. Obviously, it might not make sense to always add
the original value for all variables. We leave this as a candidate optimization for a future
work.
AC2 Algorithm We formalize the above in Algorithm 1. The evaluation, in the input,
is a list of all the variables inM and their values under~u. The rest is self-explanatory.We
slightly change the definition of ϕ from a combination of primitive events to a combina-
tion of literals. For instance, instead of writing ϕ = (X1 = 1∧X2= 0∨X3= 1), we would
use ϕ = (X1∧¬X2∨X3). In other words, we replace each primitive (X = x) ∈ ϕ with X
if x = 1 or ¬X if x= 0 in the original assignment, such that we use ϕ in a formula. The
same logic is achieved using the function f (Y = y) in line 5 of the algorithm.
Before we construct formula F , we check if ~X =~x given ~W = /0 (line 2) fulfills AC2.
Hence, in this case, we do not need to look for a ~W . Otherwise, we construct F (line 4)
that is a conjunction of ¬ϕ and the exogenous variables ofM as literals depending on ~u.
Note that ϕ does not necessarily consist of a single variable only; it can be any Boolean
formula. For example, if ϕ = (BS = 1∧BH = 0) in the notation as defined by [11], we
would represent it in F as (BS∧¬BH). This consideration is handled by Algorithm 1
without further modification. In addition, we represent each endogenous variable,Vi 6∈ ~X
with a disjunction between its equivalence formulaVi↔ FVi and its literal representation.
To conclude the formula construction, we add the negation of the candidate cause ~X =~x,
a consequence of Lemma 1.
If F , represented in a conjunctive normal form, is satisfiable, we obtain the satisfying
assignment (line 6) and compute ~W (line 7) as the set of those variables whose valuations
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were not changed in order to ensure ¬ϕ that is finally returned. If F is unsatisfiable, not
satisfiable is returned.
Minimality of ~W In Algorithm 1, we considered ~W to consist of all the variables whose
original evaluation and satisfying assignments are equal. This is an over-approximation
of the ~W set because, possibly, there are variables that are not affected by changing the
values of the cause, and are yet not required to be fixed in ~W . Despite this consideration,
a non-minimal ~W is still valid according to HP. However, to compute the degree of re-
sponsibility [6], a minimal ~W is required. Therefore, we briefly discuss a modification
that yields a minimal ~W .
We need to modify two parts of Algorithm 1. First, we cannot just consider one
satisfying assignment for F . Rather, we need to analyze all the assignments. Determining
all the assignments is called an All-SAT problem. Second, we have to further analyze
each assignment of ~W to check if we can find a subset such that F , and thus AC2, still
holds. Specifically, we check if each element in ~W is equal to its original value because
it was explicitly set so, or because it simply evaluated according to its equation. In the
latter case, it is not a required part of ~W . Precisely, in Algorithm 1, everything stays the
same until the computation of F . After that, we check whether F is satisfiable, but now
we compute all the satisfying assignments. Subsequently, for each satisfying assignment,
we compute ~Wi as explained. Then, we return the smallest ~Wi, at the cost of iterating over
all satisfying assignments of the variables in V .
4.2. Checking AC3
Our approach for checking AC3 using SAT is very similar to the one for AC2. We con-
struct another SAT formula, G. The difference between G and F is in how the parts of
the cause are represented. In G, we allow each of them to take on its original value or its
negation (e.g., A∨¬A). Clearly, we could replace that disjunction with true or 1. How-
ever, we explicitly do not perform this simplification such that a satisfying assignment
for G still contains all variables of the causal model,M.
In general, the idea is as follows. If we find a satisfying assignment forG such that at
least one conjunct of the cause ~X =~x takes on a value that equals the one computed from
its corresponding equation, then, we know that this particular conjunct is not required
to be part of the cause and there exists a subset of ~X that fulfills AC2 as well. The
same applies if the conjunct is equal to its original value in the satisfying assignment;
this would mean that it is part of a ~W such that ¬ϕ holds. When collecting all those
conjuncts, we can construct a new cause ~X ′ =~x′ by subtracting them from the original
cause and then checking whether or not it fulfills AC1. If it does, AC3 is violated because
we identified a subset ~X ′ of ~X for which both AC1 and AC2 hold.
AC3 Algorithm We formalize our approach in Algorithm 2. The input and the function
f (Vi = vi) remain the same as for Algorithm 1; the latter is omitted. In case ~X =~x is a
singleton cause or ϕ did not occur, AC3 is then fulfilled automatically (line 2). Otherwise,
line 3 shows how formula G is constructed. This construction is only different from the
construction of F in Algorithm 1 in how to treat variables ∈ ~X . They are added as a
disjunction of their positive and negative literals. Once G is constructed, we check its
satisfiability, if it is not satisfiable we return true, i.e., AC3 is fulfilled. For example, this
can be the case if the candidate cause ~X did not satisfy AC2. Otherwise, we check all its
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Algorithm 2 Check whether AC3 holds using ALL-SAT
Input: causal model M, context 〈U1, . . . ,Un〉 = 〈u1, . . . ,un〉, effect ϕ , candidate cause
〈X1, . . . ,Xℓ〉= 〈x1, . . . ,xℓ〉, evaluation 〈V1, . . . ,Vm〉= 〈v1, . . . ,vm〉
1: function FULFILLSAC3(M, ~U =~u,ϕ ,~X =~x,~V =~v)
2: if ℓ > 1∧ (M,~u) |= ϕ then
3: G := ¬ϕ ∧
∧
i=1...n f (Ui = ui) ∧
∧
i=1...m,6∃ j•X j=Vi
(
Vi ↔ FVi ∨ f (Vi = vi)
)
→֒ ∧
∧
i=1...ℓXi∨¬Xi
4: for all 〈~U =~u,~V =~v′〉 ∈ SAT(CNF(G)) do
5: if |
{
j ∈ {1, .., ℓ}|∃i•Vi = X j ∧ v
′
i 6= vi
→֒ ∧v′i 6= [
−→
V 7→~v′]FX j
}
|< ℓ then return false
6: end if
7: end for
8: end if
9: return true
10: end function
satisfying assignments. We need to do this, as G might also be satisfiable for the original
~X =~x so that we cannot say for sure that any satisfying assignment found, proves that
there exists a subset of the cause. Instead, we need to obtain all of them. Obviously, this
is problematic and could decrease the performance if G is satisfiable for a large number
of assignments. Therefore, we plan to address this in future work.
However, for now, we compute one assignment and check the count of the conjuncts
in the cause that have different values in ~v′ than their original, and that their formula does
not evaluate to this assignment (line 5). If the count is less than the size of the cause, then
AC3 is violated. Otherwise we check another assignment.
Combining AC2 and AC3 While developing Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we discov-
ered that combining both is an option for optimizing our approach. In particular, we can
exploit the relationship between the satisfying assignment(s) for the formulas F and G,
i.e.,~aF ∈ AG. This holds, as we allow the variables ~X of a cause to be both 1 or 0 in G so
that we can show that the satisfying assignment, ~aF for F in Algorithm 1 is an element
of the satisfying assignments AG, for G. Then, instead of computing both F and G, we
could just compute G, then filter those satisfying assignments that F would have yielded
and use them for checking AC2 while we use all satisfying assignments of G to check
AC3.
4.3. Example
Recall the example from Section.3. Since the context ~u sets ST = 1 and BT = 1, the
original evaluation of the model is shown in the first row of Table.1. We want to find
out whether ST = 1 is a cause of BS = 1. Algorithm.1 generates the following F , that is
satisfiable for one assignment (Table.1 second row): BS = 0, SH = 0, BH = 0, ST = 0,
BT = 1. All the variables, exceptBH and BT , change their evaluation. Thus, we conclude
that ST = 1 fulfills AC2 with ~W = {BH,BT}. Notice that even though this ~W is not
minimal, it is still valid. That said, we still can calculate a minimal ~W .
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Table 1. F , G assignments
BS SH BH ST BT
M 1 1 0 1 1
F 0 0 0 0 1
G ~a1 0 0 0 0 0
G ~a2 0 0 0 0 1
F =
¬ϕ︷︸︸︷
¬BS ∧
~u︷ ︸︸ ︷
STexo∧BTexo ∧ (
equation of BS︷ ︸︸ ︷
(BS↔ SH∨BH)∨
orig. BS︷︸︸︷
BS ) ∧ (
equation of SH
(SH↔ ST )︸ ︷︷ ︸∨orig. SHSH︸︷︷︸)
∧ ((BH↔ BT ∧¬SH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equation of BH
∨¬BH︸ ︷︷ ︸
orig. BH
) ∧ ¬ST︸︷︷︸
equation of ST
∧((BT ↔ BTexo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equation of BT
∨ BT︸︷︷︸
orig. BT
)
To illustrate checking AC3, we ask a different question: are ST = 1 and BT = 1 a
cause of BS= 1? Note that AC2 is fulfilled withW = /0, for this cause. Obviously, if both
do not throw, the bottle does not shatter. Using Algorithm 2, we obtain the following G
formula.
G=
¬ϕ︷︸︸︷
¬BS ∧
~u︷ ︸︸ ︷
STexo∧BTexo ∧ (
equation of BS︷ ︸︸ ︷
(BS↔ SH ∨BH)∨
orig. BS︷︸︸︷
BS ) ∧ (
equation of SH︷ ︸︸ ︷
(SH↔ ST )∨
orig. SH︷︸︸︷
SH )
∧ ((BH ↔ BT ∧¬SH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equation of BH
∨¬BH︸ ︷︷ ︸
orig. BH
) ∧ ( ST︸︷︷︸
orig. ST
∨ ¬ST︸︷︷︸
negated orig. ST
) ∧ ( BT︸︷︷︸
orig. BT
∨ ¬BT︸︷︷︸
negated orig. BT
)
As Table.1 shows,G is satisfiable with two assignments~a1 and~a2. For~a1, we can see
that both ST and BT have values different from their original evaluation, and that both
do not evaluate according to their equations. Thus, we cannot show that AC3 is violated,
yet. For ~a2, BT = 1, so it is equal to the evaluation of its equation. Consequently, BT is
not a required part of ~X , because ¬ϕ = ¬BS still holds although we did not set BT = 0.
So, AC3 is not fulfilled because AC1 and AC2 hold for a subset of the cause.
5. Evaluation
In this section, we provide details on the implementation of our algorithms, and evaluate
their efficiency.
5.1. Technical implementation
Our implementation is a Java library. As such, it can easily be integrated into other sys-
tems. It supports both the creation of binary causal models as well as solving causality
problems. For the modeling part and the implementation of our SAT-based approach, we
take advantage of the library LogicNG 4 . It provides methods for creating and modify-
ing boolean formulas and allows to analyze those using different SAT solvers. We use
4https://github.com/logic-ng/LogicNG
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Table 2. Evaluated causal models
Causal Model Endogenous Vars.
Abstract Models: AM1 , AM2 8 , 3
Steal Master Key: 3 suspects (SMK3), 8 suspects (SMK8) 36, 91
Leakage in Sub-sea Production System (LSP) [5] 41
Binary Trees of different heights (BT) 15 - 4095
Abstract Model 1 Combined with Binary Tree (ABT) 4103
the implementation of MiniSAT solver [8] within LogicNG. For the sake of this evalua-
tion, we will compare the execution time and memory allocation for the following four
strategies: BRUTE FORCE -a standard brute-force implementation of HP, SAT -SAT-based
approach (Algorithm1, 2), SAT MINIMAL -the minimal ~W extension, and SAT COMBINED
-optimization of the SAT-based approach by combining AC2 and AC3. All our measure-
ments were performed on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS machine equipped with an Intel R© CoreTM
i7-3740QM CPU and 8 GB RAM. For each benchmark, we specified 100 warmup and
100 measurement iterations.
5.2. Methodology and Evaluated Models
In summary, we experimented with 12 different models. On the one hand, we took the
binary models from [11]. There were 5 of them in total, namely, Rock-Throwing, For-
est Fire, Prisoners, Assassin, and Railroad. Since these examples are rather small (≤ 5
variables) and easy to understand, they mainly serve for sanity checks of our approach.
On the other hand, we used examples that do not stem from the literature on causality.
One is a security example obtained from an industrial partner. It describes the causal
factors that lead to stealing a security master key by an insider. We refer to it as SMK.
We used two variants of that example, one with 3 suspects, and the other with 8 suspects.
We also used one example from the safety domain that describes a leakage in a sub-sea
production system; we refer to it as LSP. Last, we artificially generated models of binary
trees with different heights, denoted as BTdepth, and combined them with other random
models (non-tree graphs), denoted as ABT. For a thorough description of each model,
please refer to this report [16]. Table 2 shows the list of the bigger models, along with
the number of endogenous variables. In total, we analyzed 278 scenarios, however, for
space limits, we focus on a subset of the scenarios.
5.3. Discussion and Results
In this section, we discuss some representative cases from our experiments. Table 3
shows the details of these cases. The first two columns show the scenario identifier,
namely, the name of the model and the ID of the scenario that differs in the details of the
causal query, i.e., ~X and ϕ . The latter are shown in the third and fourth columns. Then,
the results of the three conditions are displayed in columns AC1-AC3. The size of the
minimal W set is displayed in the next column. Finally, for each algorithm, the execution
time and memory allocation are shown. We write N/A in cases where the computation
was not completed in 5 minutes or consumed too much memory. As a general remark, it
does not matter which algorithm is applied if AC2 holds for an empty ~W and AC3 holds
automatically, i.e., ~X is a singleton.
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Table 3. Discussed scenarios as part of the analysis
ID ~X =~x ϕ
A
C
1
A
C
2
A
C
3
∣ ∣ ∣Min
im
al
~ W
∣ ∣ ∣
B
R
U
T
E
S
A
T
S
A
T
M
IN
IM
A
L
S
A
T
C
O
M
B
IN
E
D
S
M
K
3
3 FSU1
= 1∧FNU1
= 1∧ AU1
= 1
S
M
K
=
1
✓ ✓ ✓ 4 N/A
N/A
0.8952ms
1.0540MB
1.0924ms
1.2223MB
0.7160ms
0.9032MB
22 FSU3
= 1 ✓ ✗ ✓ – N/A
N/A
0.6159ms
0.8650MB
0.6232ms
0.8651MB
0.6098ms
0.8614MB
24 FSU3
= 1∧FNU3
= 1∧ AU3
= 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0 N/A
N/A
0.7132ms
0.9164MB
0.7217ms
0.9165MB
0.7157ms
0.9164MB
26 FSU3
= 1∧FNU3
= 1
∧AU3
= 1∧ADU3
= 1
✓ ✓ ✗ 0 N/A
N/A
0.7725ms
0.9577MB
0.7887ms
0.9577MB
0.7754ms
0.9577MB
29 AU3
= 1∧ADU3
= 1
S
D
=
1
✓ ✓ ✗ 0 0.1360ms
0.2268MB
0.7231ms
0.9198MB
0.7233ms
0.9233MB
0.7225ms
0.9198MB
L
S
P
3 X1 = 1∧X2 = 1
X
4
1
=
1
✓ ✓ ✗ 0 0.1600ms
0.2524MB
0.8600ms
1.0953MB
0.8648ms
1.0903MB
0.8598ms
1.0913MB
56 X1 = 1∧X2 = 1 ✓ ✗ ✓ – N/A
N/A
0.9464ms
1.2348MB
1.0245ms
1.2308MB
0.6984ms
0.9918MB
57 X1 = 1∧X3 = 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0 N/A
N/A
0.8032ms
1.0600MB
0.8025ms
1.0599MB
0.8092ms
1.0560MB
B
T
h
ei
g
h
t
=
1
2
34 n4093 = 1∧ n4094 = 1
n
ro
o
t
=
1
✓ ✗ ✓ – N/A
N/A
6540.3ms
2080MB
6410ms
2077MB
3587.9ms
1055.0MB
35 n4091 = 1∧ n4092 = 1
∧ n4093 = 1∧ n4094 = 1
✓ ✗ ✓ – N/A
N/A
6949ms
2090.2MB
6618ms
2090.8MB
3328.4ms
1054.9MB
A
B
T
1 n4094 = 1
I
=
1
✓ ✓ ✓ 4 N/A
N/A
3948.1ms
1055.0MB
15324ms
4019.1MB
3824.8ms
1055.5MB
4 n4093 = 1∧ n4094 = 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ 4 N/A
N/A
6379ms
2042.3MB
19043ms
5088.6MB
3718.5ms
1057.3MB
5 n4092 = 0∧ n4093 = 1∧ n4094 = 1 ✓ ✓ ✗ 5 N/A
N/A
7906ms
2047.0MB
19271ms
5123.2MB
3803.3ms
1058.8MB
As expected, the Brute-Force approach (BF) works only for smaller models (<5
variables), or in situations where only a few iterations are required. Such as scenarios
LSP-3, and SMK-29. Specifically, we see these situations when AC2 holds with a small or
empty ~W , and AC3 does not hold. That is, the number of iterations BF performs is small
because the sets, ~Wi are ordered by size. Such examples did not exhibit the major problem
of BF, i.e., the generation of all possible sets, ~Wi whose number increases exponentially,
and the iterations BF might, therefore, perform to check minimality in AC3.
For larger models ( >30 variables), BF did not return an answer in 5 minutes, espe-
cially when AC2 does not hold. This is seen by the several N/A entries in Table 3. For
example, in the SMK, the set of all possible ~Wi has a size of up to 2
35. In the worst case,
this number of iterations is required for finding out that AC2 does not hold. It is possible
that this number of iterations multiplied by the number of subsets of the cause needs to
be executed again to check AC3. This causes BF to be extremely slow and to consume a
lot of memory. The SAT by contrast, always stays below 1.5 ms and allocates less than
1.5 MB during the execution for all scenarios of the SMK. Even if larger models were
considered, SAT handles them efficiently, e.g., BT 34 - 35, where the underlying causal
model contains 4095 variables, executed in ≤ 7s. However, the latter scenarios are spe-
cial because AC2 does not hold. In ABT 1, 4 and 5, we can see that even if AC2 does
hold and ~W is not empty, SAT takes only 8s.
While obtaining a minimal ~W using our approach showed a rather small impact
relative to the SAT approach in most of the scenarios, it showed a significant increase
in some scenarios. This impact was highly dependent on the nature and semantics of the
underlying causal model. That is, we can only observe a major impact if the number of
satisfying assignments or the size of a non-minimal ~W is large as this will significantly
extend the analysis. For instance, in SMK-3, the execution time increased by about 22%.
Nonetheless, there are scenarios in which we observed a significant increase, such as the
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ABT-4 scenario. Here, the non-minimal ~W contains more than 4000 elements, leading to
an increase of more than 200% in the execution time required to determine a minimal ~W .
Finally, combining the algorithms for AC2 and AC3 is only beneficial if AC2 and
AC3 need to be explicitly analyzed (AC2 does not hold for an empty W, and the cause
is not a singleton). We have many such scenarios in our examples. In evaluating them,
we found out that there is a positive impact in using this optimization, but it is rather
small on the average. Larger differences can be seen, for instance, in ABT-5 where the
SAT-based approach executes for 7906ms while the current optimization takes 3803ms.
The main finding of our experiments is that actual causality can be computed effi-
ciently with our SAT-based approach. Within binary models of 4000 variables, we were
able to obtain a correct answer for any query in less than 4 seconds, using a memory of
1 GB.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
It is difficult to devise automated assistance for causality reasoning in modern socio-
technical systems. Causality checking, according to the formal definitions, is computa-
tionally hard. Therefore, efficient approaches that scale to the complexity of such sys-
tems are required. In the course of this, we proposed an intelligent way to utilize SAT
solvers to check actual causality in binary models in a large scale that we believe to be
particularly relevant for accountability purposes. We empirically showed that it can ef-
ficiently compute actual causality in large binary models. Even with only 30 variables,
determining causality in a brute force manner is incomputable, whereas our SAT-based
approach returned a result for such cases in 1 ms. In addition, causal models consist-
ing of more than 4000 endogenous variables were still handled within seconds using the
proposed approach.
For future work, we will consider other logic programming paradigms such as in-
teger linear programming and answer set programming to develop our approach from
checking to possibly inferring causality. Moreover, a thorough characterization of causal
model classes that affect the efficiency of the proposed approach is a useful follow-up
to this work. We plan to extend our benchmark with models of different patterns, and
different cardinalities of causes.
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A. Appendix: Lemma Proof
Lemma 2 In a binary model, if ~X =~x is a cause of ϕ , according to HP [11] definition,
then every~x′ in the definition of AC2 always satisfies ∀i• x′i = ¬xi.
Proof 1 We use the following notation:
−→
X (n) stands for a vector of length n, X1, . . . ,Xn;
and
−→
X (n) =
−→x (n) stands for X1 = x1, . . . ,Xn = xn. Let
−→
X (n) =
−→x (n) be a cause for ϕ in
some model M.
1. AC1 yields
(M,−→u ) |= (
−→
X (n) =
−→x (n))∧ (M,
−→u ) |= ϕ . (1)
2. Assume that the lemma does not hold. Then there is some index k such that x′k = xk
and AC2 holds. Because we are free to choose the ordering of the variables, let us
set k= n wlog. We may then rewrite AC2 as follows:
∃
−→
W ,−→w ,−→x ′(n) • (M,
−→u ) |= (
−→
W =−→w ) =⇒ (M,−→u ) |=[−→
X (n−1)←
−→x ′(n−1),Xn ← xn,
−→
W ←−→w
]
¬ϕ . (2)
3. We will show that equations 1 and 2 give rise to a smaller cause, namely
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x (n−1), contradicting the minimality requirement AC3. We need to show that the
smaller cause
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x (n−1) satisfy AC1 and AC2, as stated by equations 3
and 4 below. This violates the minimality requirement of AC3 for
−→
X (n) =
−→x (n).
(M,−→u ) |= (
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x (n−1))∧ (M,
−→u ) |= ϕ (3)
states AC1 for a candidate “smaller” cause
−→
X (n−1). Similarly,
∃
−→
W ∗,−→w ∗,−→x ′∗(n−1) • (M,
−→u ) |= (
−→
W ∗ =−→w ∗)
=⇒ (M,−→u ) |=
[−→
X (n−1)←
−→x ′∗(n−1),
−→
W ∗←−→w ∗
]
¬ϕ (4)
formulates AC2 for this candidate smaller cause
−→
X (n−1).
4. Let Ψ denote the structural equations that define M. Let Ψ′ be Ψ without the
equations that define the variables
−→
X (n) and
−→
W; and let Ψ′′ be Ψ without the
equations that define the variables
−→
X (n−1) and
−→
W . Clearly, Ψ′′ =⇒ Ψ′.
We can turn equation 1 into a propositional formula, namely
E1 :=
(
Ψ∧
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x (n−1)∧Xn = xn
)
∧ϕ . (5)
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Similarly, equation 3 is reformulated as
E2 :=
(
Ψ∧
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x (n−1)
)
∧ϕ . (6)
Because equation 2 holds, we fix some
−→
W ,−→w ,−→x ′(n) that make it true and rewrite
this equation as
E3 :=
(
Ψ′∧
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x ′(n−1)∧Xn = xn∧
−→
W =−→w
)
=⇒ ¬ϕ . (7)
Finally, in equation 4, we use exactly these values to also fix
−→
W ∗ =
−→
W , −→w ∗ = −→w ,
and −→x ′∗(n−1) =
−→x ′(n−1), and reformulate this equation as
E4 :=
(
Ψ′′∧
−→
X (n−1) =
−→x ′(n−1)∧
−→
W =−→w
)
=⇒ ¬ϕ . (8)
It is then a matter of equivalence transformations to show that
(Ψ′′ =⇒ Ψ′) =⇒
(
(E1∧E2) =⇒ (E3∧E4)
)
(9)
is a tautology, which proves the lemma.
